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LOCKE'S CRITERION FOR 
THE REALITY OF IDEAS: 
UNAMBIGUOUS BUT UNTENABLE 
CORNELIS DE WAAL 
When his. Essay concerning human understanding is nearly fin-
ished, Locke suddenly comes to realize that his doctrine of ideas 
leaves him with no means to distinguish reality from fiction. 
Given his view of knowledge as 'the perception of the connexion 
and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our 
Ideas' (IV. i. 2), he is forced to admit that 'the Visions of an 
Enthusiast, and the Reasonings of a sober Man, will be equally 
certain' (IV. iv. 1).1 To make matters worse, it is the enthusiast 
who would be the most knowledgeable, not only because he has 
more ideas, but also because they are the more lively (ibid.). 
'Idea' here stands for whatsoever is 'the immediate object of 
Perception, Thought, or Understanding' (II. viii. 8; cf. I. i. 8). 
In this paper I examine Locke's reaction to this problem, and 
argue against the charge, made by several commentators, that 
Locke commits himself to a double standard when determining 
whether an object we think of is real. As I will show, this 
charge results from a confusion of Locke's criterion of reality 
with its application. For Locke, there is only one criterion upon 
which something we think of is real, namely, when it conforms 
with its archetype. It is only when this criterion is applied to the 
different types of ideas that Locke distinguishes, that it works 
out differently. To support this reading I will, like Locke, 
rewrite the issue in terms of an archetype-ectype relationship 
and apply this to the three types of ideas Locke distinguishes. 
I John Locke, An essay concerning human understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch 
(Oxford 1975). All references to this work are by book, chapter, and section number. 
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Although this will prove that Locke indeed holds a single 
criterion for the reality of ideas, the result is not all that 
favourable for Locke. Part of what motivates Locke in his 
search for a criterion for the reality of ideas, is trying to avoid 
concluding that all products of our thought-including the ideas 
of mathematics and moral reasoning-must be dismissed as fic-
tion. Unfortunately, on the criterion introduced by Locke, the 
exact opposite occurs. This time far too much must be desig-
nated as real, which leaves hardly any room for anything to be a 
fiction, that is, for anything to be not real. This means that 
Locke's criterion for the reality of ideas fails on his own terms, 
that is, he is still unable to distinguish the reasonings of the 
sober man from the visions of the enthusiast. 
I 
As noted, Locke comes to realize that his 'way of ideas' leaves 
him without the means to distinguish reality from fiction. He 
reacts to this problem by holding that what we think of is real, 
as opposed to a product of our imagination, when there is, as he 
puts it, 'a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of 
Things' (IV. iv. 3). Given his belief that the understanding is 
entirely passive in experience (II. i. 25), the paradigmatic case 
in which the objects of our understanding are real is when they 
conform to things external to our understanding.2 This is 
2 Although Locke seems to reserve the rerm 'external' strictly for the objects of 
sensation, it seems to me that the objects of reflection are, on Locke's terms, also 
external. Just like the objects of sensation, the objects of reflection too are received 
passively, namely, as simple ideas (II. vi). Because of this, the objects of reflection 
can become objects of the understanding only as ideas. This makes the faculties of the 
mind as external to the understanding as the objects of sensation. Admittedly, when 
discussing reflection, Locke writes: 'This Source of Ideas, every Man has wholly in 
himself: And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects; 
yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd internal Sense' (II. i. 4; 
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because, if the understanding is indeed passive in experience, 
what it experiences cannot be a product of the understanding, 
and so cannot be a fiction of our fancy. Although Locke sees 
this as a clear case in which what we think of is real, he denies 
that this must be taken to imply that only ideas that conform to 
what is external to the understanding are real. This is especially 
clear from the way in which he raises the issue at the end of 
Book II, where he seems to present two independent criteria for 
determining whether something we think of is real-as opposed 
to a product of our fancy-one of which does not refer to an 
external reality at all.3 · 
second emphasis added). In this passage Locke clearly seems to deny that the opera-
tions of the mind are external. It is as if he is saying that although what we perceive 
in reflection is very much like perceiving external objects, the objects of reflection are 
not really external. But at the same time he treats the mind, or the soul, in much the 
same way as he treats external objects, that is as a something-we-know-not-what, or 
substratum, which is the bearer of the qualities we perceive. As Locke explains: 'the 
Operations of the Mind . . . which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor 
apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think 
these the Actions of some other Substance, which we call Spirit' (II. xx.iii. 5; cf. 15-
33). This is further confirmed by Locke's theory of the self. 
J The two chapters of Book II that deal with Locke's conception of reality are xxx 
and xxxi. These two chapters are late additions to Book II, as can be seen from earlier 
drafts of the Essay. The main body of Book II is already present in what is called 
draft B, with the exception of the last five chapters, including chapters xxx and xxxi. 
Draft B, which was written in 1671, covers only what was to become the first two 
books of the Essay. The next major draft of the Essay that survives is draft C, dated 
1685; which is four years before the Essay was printed. During the fourteen years 
between Draft B and Draft C, Locke works intermittently on problems that emerge 
from his original thesis, resulting in Books III and IV. In draft C moreover, Locke 
puts his signature directly after chapter II. xxviii, suggesting that Book II was sup-
posed to end there. Later Locke added two additional chapters to this draft. The first 
deals with clear and distinct ideas, and corresponds closely to II. xxix; the second, 
called 'Of Real and Fantastical, Adequate and Inadequate Ideas', corresponds roughly 
to what is now II. xxx and xxxi. This suggests that Locke's discussion of the reality 
of ideas is a late addition to the Essay. See P. H. Nidditch and G. A. J. Rogers (eds), 
Drafts for the Essay concerning human understanding, and other philosophical 
writings (Oxford 1990). 
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There he writes that: 
By real Ideas, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature; such as have 
a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their 
Archetypes. Fantastical or Chimerical, I call such as have no Foundation 
in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that reality of Being to which 
they are tacitly referr'd, as to their Archetypes. (II. xxx. 1)4 
According to this passage, what we think of is real, first, 
when it conforms with what Locke calls the 'real Being, and 
Existence of Things', or, second, when it conforms with its own 
archetype, irre~pective of whether this conforms with the real 
being and existence of things.s Locke's prime motive for calling 
4 This passage is both obscure and confusing. First, it is asymmetrical. In his 
definition of real ideas, Locke distinguishes two ways in which ideas can be real: first, 
by having a conformity with the 'real Being, and Existence of Things', and, second, 
by having a conformity with their archetype. This seems to imply that conforming 
with their archetype is one way in which ideas can have 'a real Foundation in 
Nature'. In the next sentence, however, where he defines fantastical ideas, Locke 
seems to deny this. There he writes that ideas are fantastical when they have no foun-
dation in nature, nor a conformity with their archetypes; thus setting conforming with 
their archetype apart from having a foundation in nature. Instead, Locke speaks of a 
'Conformity with that reality of Being to which they are tacitly referr'd, as to their 
Archetypes' (II. xxx. I, emphasis added). The distinction between real and fantastical 
ideas is further obscured by the fact that the term 'real' or 'reality' surfaces three 
times in the passage cited, and nowhere in the Essay is there a clear account of what 
the term means. It is painfully absent in Book II, which is meant to show how all 
important concepts can be the result of experience. To make things worse, each time 
the term is used in the above passage, it means something entirely different. It refers, 
first, to 'the real Being, and Existence of Things'; second, to ideas that conform with 
this real being, and existence of things; and, third, to ideas that conform with 'that 
reality of Being to which they are tacitly referr'd, as to their Archetypes', where this 
'reality of Being' is explicitly distinguished from 'the real Being, and Existence of 
Things' and of which it is not clear whether it has a foundation in naturi: or not. 
5 There seem to be several ways to interpret Locke's text. One could hold, for 
instance, that the phrases 'the reality of Things' and 'the real Being, and Existence of 
Things' are synonymous, which commits one to saying that Locke's view changed 
between IV. iv. 3 and 11. xxx. 1. One could hold alternatively that Locke's view is 
the same in both passages, which commits one to saying that the two phrases are not 
synonymous, for instance by holding that the latter denotes only a subclass of the 
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the latter real too, is to save mathematics and moral reasoning 
from being dismissed as mere products of our imagination. With 
respect to the first, he argues, 'it will be easily granted that the 
Knowledge we may have of Mathematical Truths, is not only 
certain, but real Knowledge; and not the bare empty Vision of 
vain, insignificant Chimeras of the Brain' (IV. iv. 6). Moral 
reasoning, in turn, is not at all intended to express how things 
are, btit is meant instead to express how they should be. For 
Locke, the question whether things are as they should be has no 
bearing on the claim that they should be. Tully's Offices, Locke 
notes, are not any less true when nobody in the world exactly 
practises his rules (IV. iv. 8). Making the reality of our ideas 
depend solely on a conformity with the real being and existence 
of things will· thus fail to do justice to important segments of our 
knowledge, and therefore cannot be maintained. 
Locke's more refined view, however, quickly led to the 
charge that he employs a double standard, arbitrarily switching 
from one to the other when it suits him better. This charge is 
prominent, for instance, in Leibniz's commentary on the Essay, 
in which he complains: 
You give one account of the real/chimerical distinction for ideas of 
modes, and a different one for ideas of substantial things: you have two 
distinctions, with nothing in common between them that I can see. 6 
More recently, this interpretation of Locke's conception of 
reality has been defended by James Gibson, 1 and, with the addi-
tional charge that Locke uses this double standard incoherently, 
former. This second interpretation is taken in this paper. One can also hold, of 
course, that Locke's view changed and that the phrases are not identical. 
6 Leibniz, New essays on human understanding, tr. Pi Remnant & 1. Bennett 
(Cambridge 1970), bk II, ch. xxx, sec. S; emphasis added. 
7 Locke's theory of knowledge (Cambridge 1917), pp. 132f. 
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by R. S. Woolhouse.s Others, however, like Martha Bolton9 and 
Paul Helm,10 defend Locke against the Leibnizian charge. 
Although I agree with Bolton and Helm that Locke does 
indeed hold a single criterion for the reality of ideas, I do not 
agree with their respective accounts of what this criterion is. 
Bolton paraphrases the passage from II. xxx. 1 quoted above as 
follows: 'an idea is real if it represents some real thing which it 
is supposed to represent and fantastical if it does not' .11 Depend-
ing on whether we can form ourselves an idea of this 'real 
thing', this account turns out to be either circular or incompre-
hensible. In the case in which we can form ourselves an idea of 
this 'real thing', Bolton's account will be circular, since it would 
define real ideas in terms of real ideas. In the case in which we 
cannot form ourselves an idea of these 'real things', Bolton's 
account will be incomprehensible, since real ideas would then be 
defined in terms of something we cannot get an idea of. 
Helm attributes to Locke a different criterion for the reality 
of ideas. In his view 'consistency is both necessary and sufficient 
for the reality of ideas both of mixed modes and substances'.12 
Although I think Helm is correct in his assessment that, for 
Locke, consistency is both a necessary and a sufficient criterion 
for the reality of mixed modes, I disagree with his claim that 
8 
'Locke, Leibniz, and the reality of ideas', in R. Brandt (ed.), John Locke: 
Symposium Woljc•nbuttel 1979 (Berlin 1981 ), p. 196. See also his 'Helm, and Locke 
on real ideas', The Locke newsletter 14 (1983), pp. 35-9. 
9 
'Substances, substrata, and names of essences in Locke's Essay', Philosophical 
review 85 (1976), pp. 488-513. 
10 Review of John Locke: Symposium Wolfenbuttel 1979, in The Locke newsletter 
13 (1982), pp. 71-81, esp. pp. 76ff. See also his 'Locke's real ideas, and Dr Wool-
house', ·The Locke newsletter I 5 (1984), pp. 35-42. 
11 Op. cit., p. 496. 
12 Op. cit., p. 77. 
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Locke regards consistency as also a sufficient condition for the 
reality of substances. Helm, moreover, does not discuss Locke's 
views on the reality of simple ideas, to which his criterion does 
not properly apply. 
II 
r. Perhaps the strongest sign that there is a single principle behind 
~ the two criteria given by Locke in II. xxx. 1 is that he rewrites 
;, both in terms of an archetype-ectype relation. An archetype 
(expxi7u7rov), in this context, is an original pattern or form, to 
which later things may correspond; an ectype (eKru7rov), in con-
trast, is an imprint or copy of an archetype.13 Thus whereas the 
archetype acts as a signet, able to make impressions upon other 
things, the ectype is an impression made by such a signet. To 
say that ideas are real because they conform with the real being 
and existence of things, then, is to say that they are imprints, 
impressions, or reproductions of the things themselves they 
intend to represent. With our idea of gold, for instance, Locke 
argues, we intend to represent something existing without the 
mind, of which our conception is only a rough or inaccurate 
imprint. This means that ideas which are intended to represent 
the real being and existence of things, will be real when they are 
ectypes of this real being and existence of things (cf. II. xxxi. 
13), the latter acting as their archetypes. 
This, however, is not the only way in which an idea can con-
form with its archetype. The archetype of an idea need not be 
something other than an idea; it can also be another idea, or 
13 Although Locke uses the terms ·ectype' and 'archetype', he does not give an 
account of what the terms stand for. This leaves us largely with an etymological 
reconstruction; especially since even the Oxford English Dictionary quotes from the 
Essay as a paradigmatic example of their use. 
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even the idea itself. Someone can construct by a free act of the 
understanding, say, the idea of adultery, irrespective of whether 
adultery has ever been committed, or ever will be. In this case 
the idea is itself the archetype, in that it is from then on the idea 
that determines what something must be lih for it to conform 
with that idea (IV. iv. 8). Here the situation is exactly the 
reverse of the previous one. Now the ideas are the archetypes of 
which real existences, in so far as they conform with these 
ideas, will be ectypes. 
Hence, what is at issue here is not that there are two different 
conceptions of reality which have, as Leibniz puts it, 'nothing in 
common between them', but that there are different types of 
ideas-as Locke explicitly acknowledges throughout his Essay-
for which the issue of their reality works out differently. In 
order to support this claim further, and to get a better idea of 
what exactly it amounts to, on Locke's terms, to say that an 
object of our thought is real, I will, as Locke does himself, ask, 
for each of the three types of ideas he distinguishes, when they 
are real as opposed to a product of our imagination. This then 
will provide us with the material upon which to assess Locke's 
conception of reality. 
III 
According to Locke, our ideas can be divided into three classes, 
which may be called simple ideas, substance ideas, and mode 
ideas. Although Locke presents several classifications of ideas, 
this one agrees best with our purpose, because it is these three 
types of ideas which Locke discusses with respect to their reality 
(see II. xxx. 2ff., and IV. xi. 13). 
The term 'mode idea' encompasses Locke's complex ideas of 
modes, his complex ideas of relations, his general ideas, and his 
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ideas of relation (the latter two are added only in the fourth 
edition of the Essay). Bringing the first two together under the 
heading 'mode ideas' is justified by the fact that Locke himself 
in his discussion of the reality of ideas limits himself to a sub-
class of only one of these groups, namely, mixed modes, and 
states afterwards that there is no significant difference between 
complex ideas of modes and complex ideas of relations regard-
ing their reality (see II. xxx. 4 and xxxi. 14). The last two 
classes of ideas, which are added only in the fourth edition, 
Locke does not discuss at all with respect to their reality. In fact 
Book II is not at all updated for Locke's new division. 
The term 'substance idea' stands for Locke's complex ideas 
of substance. This latter more elaborate phrase is often 
abbreviated by Locke to a mere 'substance', a term he also uses 
with other meanings. Though the term most frequently denotes a 
complex idea of substance, it occasionally stands for real 
essence (II. xxxi. 13) or for substratum (II. xxiii. 1, III. iii. 9), 
neither of which are ideas at all. 
I will begin with the question under what conditions simple 
ideas will be real, since, for Locke, mode and substance ideas 
are both combinations of simple ideas (II. xii. 1). According to 
Locke, there is no doubt that we have such simple ideas. 
Nothing can be plainer to a man, he claims, 'than the clear and 
distinct Perception he has of those simple Ideas' (II. ii. 1). For 
the sake of argument I will assume not only that Locke is right 
in claiming that we have such simple ideas, but also in claiming 
that the understanding is entirely passive with respect to. their 
reception, and that all our ideas are either simple ideas or 
combinations of them. 
Based on the criterion given above, simple ideas will be real 
when they conform with their archetype. There are two ways, 
Locke claims, in which an object of our thought can conform 
with its archetype: by being an ectype of something else (as the 
seal is to the signet ring), or by being itself the archetype (II. 
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xxx. 4; cf. II. ·~. 3). This latter, more peculiar use of the two-
place predicate '_ conforms with _' is somehow analogous 
to the more familiar use of the predicate '_ is identical with 
_' to express numerical identity. That an idea can conform 
with itself is confirmed by Locke's semiotic 'account of ideas at 
the end of book IV. Ideas are signs (IV. xxi. 4; cf. III. iii. 11; 
IV. v. 2), in which capacity they can refer either to something 
else or to themselves. 
Because the two ways of being real mentioned here are not 
mutually exclusive-since something can conform both with the 
real being and existence of things, and with itself-ideas can be 
real on both counts at the same time. I will therefore discuss 
both criteria for each type of ideas. As it turns out, simple ideas 
will be real on both counts, substance ideas will be real only on 
the first count, and mode ideas will be real only on the second 
count (seefig. 1). 
Fig.1: THE REALITY OF IDEAS 
simple idea 
substance idea 
mode idea 
Conforms with the real being 
and existence of things 
yes 
yes 
no 
Conforms with 
itself 
yes 
no 
yes 
According to Locke, the archetypes of simple ideas lie 
without the understanding. They are, as he puts it, the 'natural 
and regular productions of Things without us, really operating 
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upon us' and not 'fictions of our Fancies' (IV. iv. 4). This 
follows directly from Locke's view that all simple ideas are 
passively received by the understanding and must therefore have 
. an external origin (II. xxx. 2; cf. II. xii. 1; i. 6, 25; ii. 2). 
Because of this passivity of the understanding, Locke argues, 
simple ideas cannot but conform with their external causes, 
since it is from them that they derive their whole being. With 
this Loc~e does not intend to imply that all simple ideas are 
images or exact resemblances of what causes them. Correspon-
dence, for Locke, does not entail resemblance, as the case of 
secondary qualities shows. For simple ideas to correspond to the 
reality of things, Locke argues, it suffices that they are the 
'constant Effects' of what causes them (II. xxx. 2). In sum, 
simple ideas are real in the first sense; that is, they are ectypes 
of the real being and existence of things. 
In order to determine whether simple ideas also correspond 
to themselves, Locke introduces a second distinction pertaining 
~- to ideas in their capacity of representation: all ideas are either 
~ adequate or inadequate. Ideas are adequate when they 'perfectly 
~ represent those Archetypes which the Mind supposes them taken 
from; which it intends them to stand for, and to which it refers 
them' (II. xxxi. 1). If we combine this new distinction with 
Locke's principle for the reality of ideas-an idea is real in so 
far as it conforms with its archetype-it follows that all adequate 
ideas are real. 
Locke's next step is to show that all simple ideas are ade-
quate. Since simple ideas are 'nothing but the effects of certain 
Powers in Things, fitted and ordained by GOD, to produce such 
Sensations in us', Locke argues, 'they cannot but be correspon-
dent, and adequate to those Powers: And we are sure they agree 
to the reality of Things' (II. xxxi. 2, emphasis added). This is 
because, if simple ideas are purely given (the understanding 
being passive with regard to their reception), they cannot be 
known except by experiencing them, and only in so far as they 
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are experienced. Put differently, because simple ideas merely 
express the power in things to produce in the understanding such 
a sensation, Locke argues, they cannot fail to be the pure and 
full effect of that power (IV. iv. 4; cf. II. xxxi. 12). In sum, 
simple ideas are real on the second count as well. They conform 
with themselves. This means that simple ideas conform both 
with the real being and existence of things and with themselves. 
IV 
Having shown that all simple ideas are real on both counts, the 
question becomes how and when this is transferred to combina-
tions of simple ideas, namely substance and mode ideas. I will 
start with the first. A substance idea emerges after a certain set 
of simple ideas is often experienced together without the 
understanding playing an active role in the formation of the set. 
From the repeated confrontation with a particular set of simple 
ideas, the understanding concludes that something without it is 
responsible for those simple ideas frequently occurring together 
(II. xxiii. 1). This attribution of an external something-or 'real 
essence' -to an experienced set of simple ideas is the principal 
contribution of the understanding to the formation of substance 
ideas. It is, moreover, this 'external something' that the sub-
stance idea is meant to represent, not the particular combination 
of simple ideas that is before the mind. Rephrasing this in 
Locke's ectype-archetype distinction: the set of simple ideas that 
makes up a substance idea is an ectype of something external, or 
as Locke calls it, a real essence, which acts as its archetype (IV. 
iv. 11; cf. II. xxxi. 13).14 · 
14 Locke uses the term 'real essence' to denote the inner constitution of things as 
it is responsible for the occurrence of a particular group of simple ideas, and reserves 
the term 'nominal essence' for the group of simple ideas itself (III. iii. 15). Rephrased 
in terms of Locke's ectype/archetype distinction: the real essences are the archetypes 
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Now that the ectype and archetype for substance ideas have 
'
. been distinguished, it can be asked when substance ideas are 
real. According to Locke, substance ideas will be real when 
f they conform with the real being and existence of things. This 
t follows from the observation that a certain combination of 
simple ideas is often found together, combined with the recogni-
tion that we cannot conceive the simple ideas involved to exist 
unsuppo~ted, and the recognition that those simple ideas must 
conform with what causes them. This guarantees, first, that our 
substance ideas have an external origin; second, that the things 
themselves, which act as the· cause of our simple ideas, are 
structured; and, third, that where a number of simple ideas are 
often found together this suggests a particular structure in the 
things themselves that is responsible for it. This is as much as to 
say that the ideas thus found together are as a group the 
'constant Effect' of the things themselves (cf. II. xxx. 2), which 
is, as with simple ideas, sufficient for calling them real. 
The next question is whether these substance ideas can be 
adequate as well, since only then they will be real also on the 
second count. Let us look again at the idea of gold. According 
to Locke, we arrive at this idea by perceiving a recurrent 
combination of simple ideas (III. vi. 46). For Locke this com-
bination includes simple ideas such as yellow, heavy, hard, and 
malleable. As noted, however, it is not this particular collection 
of simple ideas which the substance idea of gold is meant to 
represent. Instead, the idea of gold is intended to represent the 
real being and existence of things in so far as this is responsible 
for that particular grouping of simple ideas. Two things may be 
noted. First, that these simple ideas are all logically indepen-
dent. It does not follow, for instance, from gold being yellow, 
of which the nominal essences are ectypes. These real essences, however, must not be 
interpreted as distinct species existing among the things themselves. Locke denies the 
existence of such species, and explicitly criticizes the claims made by advocates of the 
doctrine of substantial forms (cf. II. xxxi. 6, 8; xxxii. 18). 
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heavy, and hard, that it must be malleable. Second, that we can-
not see from the set of simple ideas itself, whether it is complete 
with respect to the real essence it is intended to represent, nor 
whether it is entirely accurate. In the course of time we may get 
a more accurate idea of gold by being differently exposed to it. 
This may lead to the discovery of new ideas which may turn out 
to be as intimately connected with gold as the others. This 
occurred, for example, when gold was found to be soluble in 
aqua regia. Or it may force us to modify the group of ideas that 
is traditionally associated with gold. The latter would occur, for 
instance, were it to be discovered that the yellowness of gold is 
caused by impurities, and that gold of itself is white. 
Although substance ideas may become reasonably fair repre-
sentations of the real being and existence of things, at least for 
practical purposes, a substance idea can never become an 
adequate representation. This is because our faculties are 
limited, as a result of which we have only a partial access to 
what causes, say, our idea of gold. That our faculties are 
limited, Locke argues, is revealed in part by telescopes and 
microscopes (cf. II. xxiii. 12), and, more radically, by the fact 
that we can conceive of beings with a thousand more faculties 
than we have (II. xxiii. 13). We have, Locke claims, as little 
ground to deny that there are such beings, as a worm shut up in 
a drawer has to deny the existence of beings with faculties like 
ours (II. ii. 3). It is because of such limitations that the reality of 
the simple ideas is only partially retained in substance ideas. 
They are real only in so far as they conform with the real being 
and existence of things. At this point there is a notable 
difference compared with simple ideas. A deficiency in faculties 
does not affect the adequacy of any of the simple ideas per-
ceived; it means only that certain simple ideas cannot be per-
ceived. 
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This brings us to the third type of ideas that Locke distinguishes, 
namely mode ideas. In contrast to substance ideas, which 
represent something without the mind, mode ideas are formed 
when the understanding freely combines simple ideas without 
the intention to represent anything besides that combination of 
ideas. In. this manner we obtain ideas like centaur or adultery, 
and even ideas that seem simple, like duration or number. From 
the fact that mode ideas are made sometimes 'very arbitrarily ... 
without Patterns, or reference to any real Existence' (III. v. 3, 
6), it may not be concluded, Locke claims, that they are made at 
random. In their production, Locke explains, the understanding 
pursues its own ends (III. v. 6). In this, communication with 
others plays a crucial role (Ill. v. 7; II. xxii. 5; III. v. 7, 8). 
Mode ideas allow us, Locke argues, '[to] represent to another 
any complex Idea, we would have him conceive' (II. xxii. 9), 
by inviting him to combine the same simple ideas as those we 
have when we use the name. This introduces a social element 
into Locke's theory, one he unfortunately only hints at, in which 
a conformity with the ordinary use within a linguistic community 
comes to determine whether a mode idea is real or not (II. xxx. 
4). When Adam, as Locke explains, constructs the idea of 
adultery after seeing that Lamech is more melancholy than 
usual, and calls it 'Niouph', this idea is distinctly a product of 
his understanding (III. vi. 44). Once the idea is formed, 
however, it is from then on determined which combinations of 
simple ideas Adam, or anyone in his linguistic community, must 
encounter for 'Niouph' to be applicable to something, other than 
Adam's voluntarily combining those ideas to express a particular 
thought (cf. Ill. v. 5). 
This means that with mode ideas the situation is exactly the 
reverse of that of substance ideas. Whereas substance ideas are 
ectypes, with the things themselves as their archetypes, mode 
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ideas are themselves archetypes, to which the things them-
selves-or real essences-may conform as ectypes (see fig. 2). 
Mode ideas, Locke explains (II. xxxi. 3), are archetypes them-
selves, made by the understanding 'to rank and denominate 
Things by'. They are originals, not copies (cf. III. v. 6; ix. 7; 
xi. 17). After the understanding created, say, the idea of a 
mermaid, it was from then on determined what an existing thing 
must conform with, for it to· be a mermaid. Since mode ideas 
are originals, they need not conform with anything besides 
themselves in order to be real, as long as 'there be a possibility 
of e.x.isting conformable to them' (II. xxx. 4; cf. III. x. 33). 
Consequently, mode ideas are real only on the second count: 
they conform with themselves. 
Fig. 2: COMPLEX IDEAS 
ARCHETYPES (ORIGINALS) ECTYPES (COPIES) 
things themselves substance ideas 
mode ideas things themselves 
We may thus conclude that Locke holds a single criterion for 
determining whether something we think of is real, and not two 
separate criteria that have, as Leibniz put it, 'nothing in com-
mon between them' (loc. cit.). This is confirmed by Locke's 
rephrasing the issue in terms of an archetype-ectype relation, 
and his application of it to the three kinds of ideas he distin-
guishes. The latter in particular reveals the presence of a 
systematic doctrine, instead of a purely ad hoc salvage operation 
to rescue moral philosophy and mathematics from being exiled 
to the realm of fiction. 
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It seems, however, that if the above is a correct interpretation of 
Locke's conception of reality, it will fail to do what Locke 
hoped it would do, namely, avoid treating the ideas of mathe-
matics and moral philosophy as on a par with allegories and 
fairy tales. Worse even, he would still be unable to distinguish 
the reas<,mings of the sober man from the visions of the 
enthusiast (IV. iv. 1), as he set out to do. This brings us to the 
second part of this paper, namely, an analysis of Locke's 
criterion of reality. 
For this we should again consider what exactly makes mode 
ideas real. As noted earlier, for Locke, the reality of mode ideas 
does not depend upon a conformity with the real being and exist-
ence of things. Since mode ideas are not intended to represent 
things themselves, Locke argues, they are real even when there 
are no things themselves that conform with them. It is sufficient 
that things themselves can conform with them, as the example of 
adultery shows. This means, Locke continues, that for mode 
ideas to be real, it suffices that they constitute a consistent set of 
simple ideas. As Locke phrases it: 'there is nothing more 
required to those kind of Ideas, to make them real, but that they 
be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable 
to them' (II. xxx. 4; cf. II. xxii. 2; xxxii. 29; IV. iv. 12). I will 
call this Locke's consistency criterion. 
In the absence of any additional criteria for the reality of 
mode ideas, however, this commits Locke to accepting that any 
set of simple ideas that can be combined consistently is real, as 
long as one abstains from judging whether there are things them-
selves that conform with it. As a consequence Cinderella's little 
glass slippers will be real too,. as long as we abstain from any 
judgement regarding their conformity with the real being and 
existence of things. This is because the consistency of the simple 
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ideas that are combined so as to make up the story of Cinder-
ella, makes it possible that the story is true, however improbable 
this may be. Hence, far from distinguishing mathematics and 
moral philosophy from myths and fancies, they are still treated 
exactly alike. The main difference is that whereas the truths of 
mathematics and morality were first dismissed as fiction, now 
even fairy tales are to be classified as real, leaving hardly any 
room for anything to be a fiction, that is, for anything to be not 
real. The only ways remaining in which something can still be a 
fiction for Locke, are when one wrongly claims that a product of 
our imagination conforms with the real being and existence of 
things (II. xxx. 5; xxxii. 25), or when one combines simple 
ideas in an incoherent way (II. xxx. 4). Both ways, in a com-
bined fashion, also surface earlier on in the Essay, when Locke 
discusses the visions of madmen (II. xi. 13). 
This view of the reality of mode ideas, however, brings us 
straight back to the point from which we started, namely 
Locke's desire to distinguish the reflections of the sober man 
from the visions of the enthusiast. If the above account of 
Locke's conception of reality is correct, Locke is still without 
the means to distinguish between the two. As long as they do not 
combine ideas in an inconsistent way, or make ideas represent 
real essences where there are none, the ideas of both have to be 
characterized ~s real. Consequently, Locke's conception of 
reality, which is introduced by him precisely to deal with this 
problem, fails to do what he intended. 
One could object to this that it ignores the fact that Locke's 
views on intuition and reason can sustain claims to, for instance, 
mathematical and moral knowledge which enable him to set 
them apart from other mode ideas, such as Cinderella's slippers. 
If we know something, either through intuition or demonstration, 
then what we think of must surely be real. Immediately after 
presenting his definition of knowledge at the beginning of book 
IV; Locke confirms this by explicitly contrasting knowledge 
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with fancy or fiction (IV. i. 2). However, even if we accept that 
, knowledge can be obtained along the lines given by Locke in the 
course of Book IV, this will not help us, since the opposite 
certainly does not hold. We may not conclude from the fact that 
we failed to obtain knowledge of an object that is before the 
understanding, that it is not real. Hence, although a study of 
Locke's views on intuition and reasoning may reaffirm the 
reality of some mode ideas, it does not follow that all other 
mode ideas are not real. The best we can do is to show that 
certain combinations of simple ideas are inconsistent, which 
brings us straight back to Locke's consistency criterion. 
One may try to overcome the limitations of this objection by 
rephrasing it in terms of a subjunctive conditional: a mode idea 
is real, as opposed to a figment, when it could be known, 
assuming sufficient attention and energy were devoted to it. This 
would have the distinct advantage that the reality of an idea no 
longer depends on the accidental circumstance whether knowl-
edge of it is obtained. However, since on Locke's terms all 
mode ideas are adequate, this can be said of all mode ideas that 
are consistent combinations of simple ideas. This is because the 
possibility of obtaining such knowledge is entailed in the very 
notion of adequacy. Hence, the ultimate criterion for the reality 
of mode ideas is still their consistency. 
To this one might again object that with respect to at least 
some ideas of mathematics and perhaps also of moral 
philosophy, it is possible to obtain certainty, something that can-
not be said of all consistent constructions of the understanding. 
We can be certain that the three angles of a triangle add up to 
two right ones, Locke argues, because when we perceive a 
triangle, we cannot conceive this to be different: 
When we possess our selves with the utmost security of the Demons-
tration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, 
What do we more but perceive, that Equality to two right ones, does 
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necessarily agree:.to, and is inseparable from the three Angles of a 
Triangle? (IV. i. 2) 
This certainty we obtain, in Locke's view, from a perception of 
the agreement and disagreement of our ide~s. This perception 
can be either immediate, in which case Locke speaks of intuitive 
knowledge, or through the mediation of other ideas, in which 
case he speaks of demonstration (IV. ii. 1 ff.). 
On the basis of this, one could argue that at least some mode 
ideas can be set apart, namely, those that are not merely per-
ceived as a possibility (in virtue of their being a consistent 
combination of simple ideas), but of which it is also perceived 
that the ideas that are combined in them cannot be otherwise 
than thus combined. This leads to what I will call Locke's 
inconceivability criterion: We can be certain that the three 
angles of a triangle add up to two right ones, because it is 
inconceivable that they should add up differently. As a result, 
Locke argues, we cannot 'conceive this Relation ... to depend on 
any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it thus, or could 
make it otherwise' (IV. iii. 29); that is, it cannot be a product of 
our fancy, which means that it must be real. 
The same conclusion can be obtained along a slightly 
different line. Because it is inconceivable that the angles of a 
triangle should add up otherwise than to 180 degrees, we can be 
certain that their sum is 180 degrees. This means, Locke argues, 
that we know that the three angles of a triangle equal two right 
ones (IV. i. 2). Since, as was noted earlier, the object of knowl-
edge-as opposed to that of belief or opinion-is a real idea and 
not a fiction of our fancy, we can derive from the fact that we 
know that the angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees, ~hat it is a 
real fact that their sum is 180 degrees. 
In sum, using the inconceivability criterion, Locke can clas-
sify some mode ideas as real in a way that does not commit him 
to calling all consistent constructions of the understanding real. 
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This, in turn, allows him to distinguish between the careful 
deliberations of the sober man, which result in knowledge, and 
the visions of the enthusiast, which fall short of knowledge. 
It appears, however, that this inconceivability criterion is not 
without problems of its own. First, assuming the criterion to be 
valid, one could object that again too much must be dismissed as 
fiction, and that therefore it fails to distinguish properly the care-
ful considerations of the sober man from the reveries of the 
enthusiast. It would commit us to saying that only those mode 
ideas of which it cannot be conceived that they are not so com-
bined, would qualify as real. The perception that a certain group 
of simple ideas cannot be conceived to be otherwise than thus 
combined, includes besides the recognition that they cannot be 
combined in any other way, also the recognition that they cannot 
be not combined. 
Apart from the objection that the inconceivability criterion 
dismisses too much as mere fiction, one could argue that the 
criterion is of itself untenable. Inconceivability may be a neces-
sary condition for a certain combination of simple ideas to be 
impossible, but it is not a sufficient condition. This is because 
sometimes what we conceive to be impossible, turns out to be 
possible after all, as can be illustrated with Euclid's famous 
axiom that the whole is always greater than its parts. This 
axiom, which was thought to be necessarily true on the ground 
that its denial could not be conceived-with which it fits Locke's 
characterization of intuitive knowledge-was proved to be 
wrong by Georg Cantor well over two millennia after Euclid 
formulated it. Cantor showed that a subset of the integers-those 
that are even-can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with 
all integers, since for each integer there is a number that is its 
double, which is always even. Because of this one-to-one corres-
pondence there are as many integers as there are even numbers. 
At the same time, however, the even numbers make up only half 
of the integers, odd numbers making up the other half, since 
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there is an odd number between any two subsequent even num-
bers. IS 
Hence, there are at least two major problems with the 
inconceivability criterion. First, if it is used to distinguish real 
from fantastical mode ideas, it commits us to saying that only 
those mode ideas that consist of combinations of simple ideas 
that cannot be otherwise than thus combined are real. Second, 
the immediate perception that ideas cannot be otherwise than 
thus combined, does not by itself guarantee that the ideas must 
indeed be thus combined. Because of the latter we cannot use 
Locke's conception of intuitive knowledge as a means to set 
apart certain mode ideas as real, even should we accept the 
limitations that come with this new criterion. As a result, Locke 
remains committed to his claim that all mode ideas that are con-
sistent combinations of simple ideas are real; meaning that he is 
still unable to distinguish the careful considerations of the sober 
man from the visions of the enthusiast, as long as the latter's 
ideas remain internally consistent.16 
ts Both the example and the argument are derived from C. S. Peirce. See C. 
Hartshorne & P. Weiss (eds), Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cam-
bridge, MA 1931-58), vol. 2, sections 29-30. 
16 Special thanks go to Susan Haack for her comments on earlier versions of this 
paper. Responsibility for any mistakes or weaknesses, however, remains entirely my 
own. 
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